1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Todd M. Friedman (SBN 216752) tfriedman@toddflaw.com Adrian R. Bacon (SBN 280332) abacon@toddflaw.com Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, P.C. 21550 Oxnard St., Suite 780 Woodland Hills, CA 91367-7104 Telephone: 877-206-4741 Facsimile: 866-633-0228 Counsel for Plaintiff	
8	Manuel S. Hiraldo	
9	Pro Hac Vice Forthcoming 401 E. Las Olas Boulevard	
10	Suite 1400	
11	Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 mhiraldo@hiraldolaw.com	
12	Telephone: 954.400.4713	
13	Counsel for Plaintiff	
14	UNITED STATES	DISTRICT COURT
15	NORTHERN DISTR	ICT OF CALIFORNIA
16)	Case No.
17	ALLISON FERJEAN, individually and)	
18	on behalf of all others similarly) situated,	<u>CLASS ACTION</u>
19)	COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
20	Plaintiff,)	AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF PURSUANT TO THE
)	
21	vs.	TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. §
21 22)	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.
	vs.) FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC., and) DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and)	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
22	FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC., and)	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.
22 23	FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.
222324	FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them,	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.
22232425	FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them,	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.
2223242526	FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC., and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and each of them,	PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227, ET SEQ.

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

ALLISON FERJEAN ("Plaintiff") brings this class action against FIVE STARS LOYALTY, INC. ("Defendant"), and alleges as follows upon personal knowledge as to herself and her own acts and experiences, and, as to all other matters, upon information and belief, including investigation conducted by her attorneys.

NATURE OF THE ACTION

- 1. This putative class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., ("TCPA"), stems from Defendant's knowing and willful violations of the TCPA.
- 2. The case arises from the transmission of text messages to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and members of the class for the purpose of promoting Defendant's services.
- 3. Defendant operates a rewards and marketing program. To drum-up new business, Defendant engages in intrusive telemarketing campaigns.
 - 4. Defendant is well-aware of the restrictions imposed by the TCPA.
- 5. Nevertheless, Defendant engages in illegal telemarketing, targeting individuals nationwide, without their prior express consent and little regard for their privacy.
 - 6. Through this putative class action, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to halt

11

14 15

16 17

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26

27 28

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

Defendant's illegal conduct which has resulted in the invasion of privacy, harassment, aggravation, and disruption of the daily life of thousands of individuals nationwide. Plaintiff also seeks statutory damages on behalf of himself and members of the class, and any other available legal or equitable remedies resulting from the illegal actions of Defendant.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) because Plaintiff, a 7. resident of Texas, seeks relief on behalf of a Class, which will result in at least one class member belonging to a different state than that of Defendants, a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in California. Plaintiff also seeks \$1,500.00 in damages for each call in violation of the TCPA, which, when aggregated among a proposed class in the thousands, exceeds the \$5,000,000.00 threshold for federal court jurisdiction. Therefore, both diversity jurisdiction and the damages threshold under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") are present, and this Court has jurisdiction. This Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 47 U.S.C. § 227.
- 8. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and 1441(a) because Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the County of San Francisco, State of California
 - 9. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it conducts

3

4 5

6 7

8 9

10 11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18 19

20

21

22

23

24

25 26

27 28 business in this state, and its principle place of business is in this District.

PARTIES

- 10. Plaintiff is a natural person who, at all times relevant to this action, was a resident of the State of Texas. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a "person" as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39).
- 11. Defendant is a Delaware limited liability company whose principal office is located at 340 Bryant St #300, San Francisco, CA 94107. Defendant directs, markets, and provides its business activities throughout the United Stated.
- 12. The above named Defendant, and its subsidiaries and agents, are collectively referred to as "Defendants." The true names and capacities of the Defendants sued herein as DOE DEFENDANTS 1 through 10, inclusive, are currently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues such Defendants by fictitious names. Each of the Defendants designated herein as a DOE is legally responsible for the unlawful acts alleged herein. Plaintiff will seek leave of Court to amend the Complaint to reflect the true names and capacities of the DOE Defendants when such identities become known.
- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes that at all relevant times, each and every Defendant was acting as an agent and/or employee of each of the other Defendants and was acting within the course and scope of said agency and/or employment with the full knowledge and consent of each of the other Defendants. Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of the acts and/or omissions complained of herein was made known

CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

to, and ratified by, each of the other Defendants.

THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

- 14. The TCPA regulates and restricts the use of automatic telephone equipment. Furthermore, the TCPA protects consumers from unwanted calls, text messages, and facsimile transmissions that are made utilizing an automatic telephone dialing system and/or prerecorded messages.
- 15. The TCPA prohibits: (1) any person from calling a cellular telephone number; (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded message; (3) without the recipient's prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).
- 16. The TCPA defines an "automatic telephone dialing system" ("ATDS") as "equipment that has the capacity (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
- 17. In an action under the TCPA, a plaintiff must only show that the defendant "called a number assigned to a cellular telephone service using an automatic dialing system or prerecorded voice." *Breslow v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2012), aff'd, 755 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2014).
- 18. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") is empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the TCPA. According to the FCC's findings, calls in violation of the TCPA are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or

14

15

16

18

17

19

20 21

25

27

28

prerecorded telephone calls are a greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient. The FCC also recognized that wireless customers are charged for incoming calls whether they pay in advance or after the minutes are used. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278, Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).

- In 2012, the FCC issued an order tightening the restrictions for automated 19. telemarketing calls, requiring "prior express written consent" for such calls to wireless numbers. See In the Matter of Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer *Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1838 ¶ 20 (Feb. 15, 2012)(emphasis supplied).
- To obtain express written consent for telemarketing calls, a defendant must 20. establish that it secured the plaintiff's signature in a form that gives the plaintiff a "'clear and conspicuous disclosure' of the consequences of providing the requested consent....and having received this information, agrees unambiguously to receive such calls at a telephone number the [plaintiff] designates." In re Rules & Regulations *Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 27 F.C.C.R. 1830, 1837 ¶ 18, 1838 ¶ 20, 1844 ¶ 33, 1857 ¶ 66, 1858 ¶ 71 (F.C.C. Feb. 15, 2012).
- 21. The TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC define "telemarketing" as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase" or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12).

In determining whether a communication constitutes telemarketing, a court must evaluate the ultimate purpose of the communication. See *Golan v. Veritas Entm't, LLC*, 788 F.3d 814, 820 (8th Cir. 2015).

- 22. "Neither the TCPA nor its implementing regulations 'require an explicit mention of a good, product, or service' where the implication of an improper purpose is 'clear from the context." *Id.* (citing *Chesbro v. Best Buy Stores, L.P.*, 705 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2012)).
- 23. "Telemarketing' occurs when the context of a call indicates that it was initiated and transmitted to a person for the purpose of promoting property, goods, or services." *Golan*, 788 F.3d at 820 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(12); *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 F.C.C. Rcd at 14098 ¶ 141, 2003 WL 21517853, at *49).
- 24. The FCC has explained that calls motivated in part by the intent to sell property, goods, or services are considered telemarketing under the TCPA. See *In re Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991*, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶¶ 139-142 (2003). This is true whether call recipients are encouraged to purchase, rent, or invest in property, goods, or services during the call or in the future. *Id*.
- 25. In other words, offers "that are part of an overall marketing campaign to sell property, goods, or services constitute" telemarketing under the TCPA. See *In re*

Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14014, ¶ 136 (2003).

- 26. If a call is not deemed telemarketing, a defendant must nevertheless demonstrate that it obtained the plaintiff's prior express consent. See *In the Matter of Rules and Regulaions Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991*, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7991-92 (2015) (requiring express consent "for non-telemarketing and non-advertising calls").
- 27. "Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients. A plaintiff alleging a violation under the TCPA 'need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified." *Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC*, No. 14-55980, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 1591, at *12 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 2017) (quoting *Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016), as revised (May 24, 2016)) (emphasis in original).

FACTS


28. On or about January 16, 2018, Defendant using an automated text-messaging platform, causing the following text message be transmitted to Plaintiff's cellular telephone:

Hi there! Yummie Street Food -

Houston is now using <u>FiveStars.com</u> for rewards! To join reply Y. txt OFF

578-277

(i)



- 29. Defendant's text message constitutes telemarketing because it promotes Defendant's goods and services.
- 30. The hyperlink contained within the text message links to Defendant's website, where Defendant promotes its good and services.
- 31. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent to be contacted by text messages using an ATDS.
 - 32. Plaintiff has never had any type of relationship with Defendant.
 - 33. Plaintiff has never provided her telephone number to Defendant.
- 34. At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express written consent or express consent to be contacted using an ATDS or a prerecorded message.

10

15 16

14

18

17

19 20

22

21

24

25

23

26

27 28

- 35. Plaintiff is the subscriber and user of the cellular telephone number that received the offending text messages.
- 36. The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant's text message establishes that Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages. See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) ("These assertions, combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.") (citing Legg v. Voice Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding it "plausible" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).
- 37. Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at

the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention.

38. In fact, Defendant admits that it sends automatic marketing offers on its own website:

Meet AutoPilot

AutoPilot is the tool at the heart of the Fivestars program, sending your customers the targeted offers they'll love—totally automatically. We designed AutoPilot explicitly for the needs of local businesses (and their time-strapped owners) to deliver the perfectly-timed nudges that get customers coming back and spending more.

39. Below is another image, wherein Defendant acknowledges that they "automatically send campaigns" through their Autopilot feature including "app notification, text message, or email, which is "10x more effective than other marketing tools."

¹ Fivestars, Marketing Automation, https://www.fivestars.com/products/marketing-automation/ (last visited March 7, 2018).

3

4 5

6

7 8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2526

27

28

We automatically send campaigns that are 10X more effective

Our AutoPilot feature automatically sends your customers an app notification, text message, or email with special offers that bring them back 10x more effectively than other marketing tools



2

40. Defendant's unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant's text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.

CLASS ALLEGATIONS

PROPOSED CLASS

- 41. Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated.
 - 42. Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:

All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant's behalf, to said person's cellular telephone number, for the purpose of promoting Defendant's property, goods, and/or

² Fivestars, How It Works, https://www.fivestars.com/businesses/how-it-works/ (last visited March 7, 2018).

services, without their prior express written consent.

43. Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several thousands, if not more.

NUMEROSITY

- 44. Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the United States without their prior express consent. The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.
- 45. The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of ministerial determination from Defendant's call records.

COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT

- 46. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the questions of law and fact common to the Class are:
 - (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff's and Class members' cellular telephones using an ATDS;
 - (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained

1 prior express written consent to make such calls; 2 (3) Whether Defendant's conduct was knowing and willful; 3 4 (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such 5 damages; and 6 (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the 7 8 future. 9 47. The common questions in this case are capable of having common 10 11 answers. If Plaintiff's claim that Defendant routinely violates the TCPA is correct, 12 Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently 13 adjudicated and administered in this case. 14 15 **TYPICALITY** 16 Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they 48. 17 18 are all based on the same factual and legal theories. 19 PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF THE CLASS MEMBERS 20 Plaintiff is a representative who will fully and adequately assert and protect 49. 21 22 the interests of the Class, and has retained competent counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiff is 23 an adequate representative and will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 24 25 Class. 26 PROCEEDING VIA CLASS ACTION IS SUPERIOR AND ADVISABLE 27 28 50. A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

10

8

12 13

14 15

16

17 18

19

20

21 22

23

24

25 26

27

28

efficient adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the Class is economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable. While the aggregate damages sustained by the Class are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant's wrongful conduct are too small to warrant the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.

51. The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant. For example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another may not. Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although certain class members are not parties to such actions.

COUNT I Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)

- 52. Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.
- 53. It is a violation of the TCPA to make "any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using

¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).

 any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice...to any telephone number assigned to a...cellular telephone service...." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).

54. "Automatic telephone dialing system" refers to any equipment that has the "capacity to dial numbers without human intervention." *See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs.*,

- *Inc.*, No. 07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232,
- 55. Defendant or third parties directed by Defendant used equipment having the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.
- 56. These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained express written consent to make such calls. In fact, Defendants did not have prior express written consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members when the subject calls were made.
- 57. Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.
- 58. As a result of Defendant's conduct, and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each

25

26

27

28

entitled to a minimum of \$500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an injunction against future calls.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Allison Fejeran, on behalf of herself and the other members of the Class, pray for the following relief:

- a. A declaration that Defendant's practices described herein violate the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;
- b. A declaration that Defendant's violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing;
- c. An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior written express permission of the called party;
- c. An award of actual and statutory damages; and
- d. Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff and Class Members hereby demand a trial by jury.

DOCUMENT PRESERVATION DEMAND

Plaintiff demands that Defendant take affirmative steps to preserve all records, lists, electronic databases or other itemization of telephone or fax numbers

Case 3:18-cv-01490-JD Document 1 Filed 03/08/18 Page 18 of 18

1	associated with the Defendant and the communication or transmittal of
2	advertisements as alleged herein.
3	advertisements as aneged nerem.
4	D (C.11 C.1 '44 141' 04 D CM 1 2010
5	Respectfully Submitted this 8th Day of March, 2018.
6	LAW OFFICES OF TODD M. FRIEDMAN, P.C.
7	By: /s/ Todd M. Friedman
8	Todd M. Friedman Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman
9	Attorney for Plaintiff
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	
27	
28	